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 NOTE 
Stand with Sam: Missouri, Survivor 
Benefits, and Discrimination Against    
Same-Sex Couples 
Glossip v. Missouri Department of Transportation and Highway Patrol 
Employees’ Retirement System, 411 S.W.3d 796 (Mo. 2013). 
LESLEY A. HALL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Michael, are you a gay man?” asked Chris Connelly, ESPN’s Outside 
the Lines host.1  “I am a gay man,” Michael Sam responded, “And I’m happy 
to be one.”2  On February 9, 2014, Michael Sam garnered the University of 
Missouri (“Mizzou”) football team international attention – but this time, it 
was not because of his skills as Mizzou’s All-American defensive lineman 
and the Associated Press’s SEC Defensive Player of the Year.3  Michael was 
the first NFL-bound collegiate football player to openly state he was gay be-
fore the NFL draft.4  “I understand how big this is . . . .  [I]t’s a big deal.  No 
one has done this before.  And it’s kind of a nervous process, but I know what 
I want to be . . . .  I want to be a football player in the NFL.”5 
Michael Sam’s proclamation of his sexuality has been met with enthusi-
astic support and harsh criticism.  Many supporters, including many Mizzou 
students, formed a human wall around Mizzou Arena to block members of 
the Westboro Baptist Church, which had come to protest Michael Sam’s ho-
mosexuality.6  However, others were not so enthusiastic.  New York Giants 
cornerback Terrell Thomas said, “I think society is ready for [an openly gay 
 
*B.S., Missouri State University, 2009; M.B.A., Missouri State University, 2011; 
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thank Professor Douglas Abrams for all of his help and support. 
 1.  Chris Connelly, Mizzou’s Michael Sam Says He’s Gay, ESPN OUTSIDE THE 
LINES (Mar. 11, 2014, 5:18 PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10429030/mi-
chael-sam-missouri-tigers-says-gay. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Dave Urbanski, Missouri Students Block Westboro Baptist Protest Against 
Gay NFL Hopeful Michael Sam – Give Him Standing-O in Arena, THE BLAZE (Feb. 
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NFL football player] and America’s ready for it, but I don’t think the NFL 
is.”7  Even fiercer was Gordon Klingenschmitt, a.k.a. “Dr. Chaps,” a former 
Navy chaplain, who denounced Sam in a recent episode of his “Pray In Jesus’ 
Name” program: “It’s a tragedy every time somebody comes out of the closet 
. . . .  [I]t’s not something to be celebrating.”8 
The sad irony was that Michael Sam felt compelled to admit his sexual 
orientation to the world, fearing “how many people knew,” and that he would 
suffer retaliation for it.9  Michael is not alone; many gay and lesbian individ-
uals fear “coming out” to friends, family, and co-workers because they are 
afraid of the possibility of retaliation, harassment, isolation, or worse.10 
In Glossip v. Missouri Department of Transportation and Highway Pa-
trol Employees’ Retirement System,11 the Supreme Court of Missouri perpet-
uated these fears.  The court refused to identify sexual orientation as a classi-
fication worthy of heightened or “intermediate” equal protection scrutiny,12 
signaling to Missourians that homosexuality is still something to discount, 
fear, and hide.  The holding also erroneously deprived Kelly Glossip of Cor-
poral Engelhard’s survivor benefits after Engelhard, his partner of many 
years, was killed in the line of duty.13  This Note discusses the resolution of 
this case and analyzes why the court’s holding demonstrates a regressive step 
for gays and lesbians in Missouri and elsewhere.  Part II analyzes the facts 
and holding of Glossip.  Part III discusses the Missouri Constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause, sexual orientation and federal jurisprudence, and Mis-
souri’s statutory and constitutional bans on same-sex marriage.  Part IV ex-
amines the Supreme Court of Missouri’s rationale in Glossip, including Judge 
Teitelman’s dissent.  Part V analyzes why the majority erred in determining 
that the Missouri survivor benefits statute discriminated against non-married 
couples, when the discriminatory characteristic was clearly sexual orientation.  
This Note ends by explaining that sexual orientation should receive height-
ened or “intermediate” scrutiny, under which the Missouri survivor benefits 
statute would have been held to have violated Glossip’s rights under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Missouri Constitution. 
 
 7. Dan Graziano, CB: NFL Not Ready for Gay Player, ESPN N.Y. (Feb. 12, 
2014, 1:59 PM), http://espn.go.com/new-york/nfl/story/_/id/10442283/terrell-tho-mas
-new-york-giants-says-nfl-not-ready-gay-player. 
 8. Michael Sam’s Coming Out ‘Is a Tragedy,’ According to Ex-Navy Chaplain 
Gordon Klingenschmitt, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 11, 2014, 5:59 PM), http://www.hu-
ffingtonpost.com/2014/03/11/michael-sam-gordon-klingenschmitt_n_4943967.html. 
 9. Connelly, supra note 1. 
 10. See infra notes 180-182 
 11. 411 S.W.3d 796 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 12. Id. at 800. 
 13. Contra id. at 799. 
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Corporal Dennis Engelhard, a Missouri State Highway Patrol veteran, 
was killed “in the line of duty” on December 25, 2009.14  Appellant Kelly D. 
Glossip was Engelhard’s surviving same-sex partner.15  After Engelhard’s 
death, “Glossip applied to the Missouri Department of Transportation and 
Highway Patrol Employees’ Retirement System (“MPERS”) for survivor 
benefits” under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 104.140(3).16  He then 
“submitted his driver’s license, Engelhard’s death certificate, and an affida-
vit,” stating that he and Engelhard “had cohabited in a same-sex relationship 
since 1995.”17  The affidavit further stated that they held themselves out to 
friends and family as a couple in a committed marital relationship, and would 
have married had Missouri law permitted them to do so.18  MPERS denied 
Glossip’s application for survivor benefits, claiming that he and Engelhard 
lacked a marriage certificate.19  Glossip unsuccessfully appealed the denial to 
the MPERS Board of Trustees.20 
Glossip then filed a petition requesting declaratory and injunctive relief 
in the Circuit Court of Cole County.21  He argued that the survivor benefits 
statute and Missouri Revised Statutes Section 104.012 violated the Missouri 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause because he was excluded from survi-
vor benefits for his sexual orientation.22  MPERS moved to dismiss Glossip’s 
amended petition on the ground that it failed to state a claim for which relief 
could be granted, and Glossip moved for summary judgment.  The trial court 
granted MPERS’s motion to dismiss.23 
Glossip appealed, and on October 29, 2013, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri granted transfer and held that Missouri’s survivor benefits statute did 
not impermissibly discriminate against Glossip because it required him and 
Engelhard to be married; thus, Glossip could not receive the spousal benefits 
because he and Engelhard were not married when Engelhard died.24  The 
court applied rational basis scrutiny to the survivor benefits statute and held 
that Missouri’s interests in providing benefits to economically dependent 
surviving spouses, controlling costs, and efficient administration satisfied the 
 
 14. Id. at 800. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.; see MO. REV. STAT. §§ 104.012, 451.022 (Supp. 2001). 
 20. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 800. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 800-01. 
 23. Specifically, the trial court also dismissed Glossip’s motion for summary 
judgment as moot and dismissed his amended petition with prejudice.  Id. at 801. 
 24. Id. at 804-05. 
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Missouri Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause because these were legiti-
mate state interests.25  Judge Teitelman wrote the dissenting opinion.26 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
To provide a sufficient legal context, this Note discusses both the consti-
tutional issues presented in Glossip and the statutes at issue.  First, Section A 
discusses the Missouri Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and its various 
levels of scrutiny.  Next, Section B discusses the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States’ constitutional decisions regarding sexual orientation, and Section C 
discusses the Missouri Constitution’s prohibition on same-sex marriages.  
Then, Section D discusses Missouri’s Survivor Benefits statute.  Finally, Sec-
tion E discusses Missouri’s statutory proscription of same-sex marriages. 
A.  The Missouri Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause 
The Missouri Constitution and the U.S. Constitution each contain equal 
protection clauses.27  The Missouri Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause 
has been construed to be coextensive with its federal counterpart, but Mis-
souri courts are reluctant to extend the state’s Equal Protection Clause beyond 
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.28  Article I, Section 2 of the Mis-
souri Constitution states as follows: 
That . . . all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of 
happiness and the enjoyment of gains of their own industry; that all 
persons are created equal and are entitled to equal rights and oppor-
tunity under the law; that to give security to these things is the princi-
pal office of the government, and that when government does not con-
fer this security, it fails its chief design.29 
Article 1, Section 2 of the Missouri Constitution guarantees that persons 
similarly situated in relation to a statute be treated equally.30  When faced 
with the question of whether a statute violates the state or federal equal pro-
tection clause(s), a court must first determine the level of scrutiny to apply to 
the statute.31  Traditionally, courts have had three options from which to 
 
 25. Id. at 805-07. 
 26. Id. at 809. 
 27. MO. CONST. art. I, §2; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 28. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 805. 
 29. MO. CONST. art. I, §2 (emphasis added). 
 30. 32 ROBERT H. DIERKER, History, Constitutional Issues, Classification of 
Offenses, Principles of Liability and Defenses, in MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES, 
MISSOURI CRIMINAL LAW § 2.3 (2d ed. 2014). 
 31. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 805. 
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choose: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis scrutiny.32  
However, other, non-traditional levels of scrutiny have arisen in case law that 
do not fit within the parameters of the traditional three-tier analysis.33  These 
levels have often been equivocally labeled “Heightened Scrutiny.”34 
1.  Strict Scrutiny 
When a plaintiff files an equal protection challenge to a state law that 
impinges upon a fundamental right or disadvantages a suspect classification, 
the courts apply strict scrutiny.35  Strict scrutiny applies where the law dis-
criminates based on race, national origin, or ethnicity.36  Strict scrutiny also 
applies when the law limits a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech.37  
The statute survives only when the state establishes a “compelling interest,” 
and where the law or ordinance is narrowly tailored such that there are no less 
restrictive means available to achieve the desired effect.38  This standard of 
review imposes a heavy burden on the state, and laws reviewed under strict 
scrutiny usually fail this rigorous standard.39 
2.  Intermediate Scrutiny 
Intermediate scrutiny usually involves “mid-range scrutiny” and applies 
to claims of discrimination based on gender or status as a non-marital child, 
among others.40  While intermediate scrutiny grants more deference to legis-
lative acts than strict scrutiny – thus providing an easier standard for the gov-
ernment to overcome – it nonetheless provides greater protection than ration-
al basis scrutiny.41  In intermediate scrutiny cases, the government bears the 
burden of showing that the classification promotes an “important governmen-
tal” interest.42  Courts have established a two-prong test that challengers must 
 
 32. See DIERKER, supra note 30. 
 33. Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis With Bite: Why the 
Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classi-
fications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2774-76 (2005). 
 34. Id. at 2770. 
 35. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 805. 
 36. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
695, 771 (4th ed. 2011). 
 37. 16B AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 862 (2014). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION: EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND LITIGATION § 
4:25 (2013) (“[O]ccasionally lower courts recognize quasi-fundamental rights such as 
the right of intrastate travel, a denial of liberty based on indigence, expression, educa-
tion, or gun possession . . . .”). 
 41. Brent L. Caslin, Gender Classifications and United States v. Virginia: Mud-
dying the Waters of Equal Protection, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 1353, 1359 (1997). 
 42. Id. at 1364. 
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overcome in order to justify the classification: “first, the classification must 
serve an important government objective, and second, the classification must 
be substantially related to the achievement of that objective.”43  Courts have 
consistently struck down laws that restrict protected classifications if the re-
striction is “archaic and overbroad,”44 or if the restrictions are generaliza-
tions,45 are invidious,46 or are based on stereotypical notions.47 
3.  Rational Basis Scrutiny 
The rational basis standard is the most relaxed and is thus the most fa-
vorable standard to the government.48  If a law does not involve suspect clas-
sification or fundamental rights it is examined under the rational basis stand-
ard, which “requires only that the classification reasonably further a legiti-
mate governmental purpose[.]”49  Under this standard, the government need 
only establish that the law is “rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest or purpose.”50  Essentially, unless the different treatment of various 
groups is thoroughly unrelated to achievement of a legitimate purpose, the 
law will survive challenge under the equal protection clause.51 
4.  Heightened Scrutiny 
Courts have applied a fourth level of scrutiny, which provides a higher 
level of scrutiny than rational basis, but has not been placed within the defini-
tions of strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny.52  Indeed, as discussed below, 
the dissent in Glossip argued that this fourth type of scrutiny – “heightened 
scrutiny” – should be the level of scrutiny used to analyze sexual orienta-
tion.53  The test for heightened scrutiny was established by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Bowen v. Gilliard,54 which required heightened scrutiny when a per-
son “(1) has suffered a history of discrimination; (2) exhibits obvious, immu-
 
 43. Id. at 1360. 
 44. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Caslin, supra note 41, at 1360. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1120 (2014). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Smith, supra note 33, at 2775. 
 53. Glossip v. Mo. Dep’t of Transp. & Highway Patrol Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 411 
S.W.3d 796, 813 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 54. 483 U.S. 587 (1987).  In Bowen, children of low-income mothers sought to 
enjoin state and federal officials from enforcing Federal Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) child support attribution requirements, suggesting that it 
violated the Fifth Amendment.  See id. at 590-91.  The Court held that rational basis, 
not heightened scrutiny, was the standard that applied.  Id. at 601. 
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table, or distinguishing characteristics that define him as a member of a dis-
crete group; and (3) shows that the group is politically powerless or a minori-
ty, or that the statutory classification at issue burdens a fundamental right.”55  
Equal protection jurisprudence has espoused that the classification must be 
unrelated to the person’s “ability to contribute to society,”56 as those laws 
lack a sufficient nexus between the discriminatory characteristic and the law 
enacted to serve any purpose other than “deep-seated prejudice.”57  Further-
more, equal protection jurisprudence requires that the group discriminated 
against must have suffered a history of “intentional, invidious discrimination 
against the group of which he or she is a member because of the characteristic 
at issue.”58 
The Court has espoused two other prongs that, while not dispositive, 
have proved helpful in determining whether the discriminated class is entitled 
to heightened scrutiny.59  The first is the “immutability characteristic,” which 
is a personal characteristic “determined solely by accident of birth.”60  Like 
race or gender, congenital personal characteristics receive heightened scrutiny 
because the characteristics do not bear on that person’s responsibility to soci-
ety.61  Courts have maintained that some immutable characteristics are not 
necessarily limited to those defined at birth, but include characteristics “that 
are so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for government 
to penalize a person for refusing to change them.”62  While they are im-
portant, the Court deemed that some immutable characteristics are not dispos-
itive to heightened scrutiny determinations because such characteristics must 
be balanced against the governmental interest in enacting the discriminatory 
statute and the impact that the characteristic has on that person’s “self-
perception, group affiliation, and identification by others.”63 
The second prong is the group’s lack of political power.64  This factor 
has received diminished weight because most groups are not considered “‘po-
 
 55. Smith, supra note 33, at 2774. 
 56. Id. at 2775 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)). 
 57. Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Andrea L. Claus, The Sex Less Scrutinized: The Case for Suspect Classifica-
tion for Sexual Orientation, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 151, 153 (2011) (quoting Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Smith, supra note 33, at 2776 (citing Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 
726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) (“It is clear that by ‘immutability’ the 
Court has never meant strict immutability in the sense that members of the class must 
be physically unable to change or mask the trait defining their class.  People can have 
operations to change their sex.  Aliens can ordinarily become naturalized citizens.  
The status of illegitimate children can be changed . . . .”)). 
 63. Id. at 2776; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 
440 (1985). 
 64. Smith, supra note 33, at 2776. 
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litically powerless’ . . . in the sense that ‘they have no ability to attract the 
attention of lawmakers.’”65 
B.  Sexual Orientation and Federal Constitutional Jurisprudence 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not definitively stated whether sexual ori-
entation is a suspect classification.66  Consequently, state courts differ con-
cerning what level of scrutiny to apply to sexual orientation.67  The difference 
could be attributed to a disagreement about immutability because some medi-
cal experts believe that homosexuality is congenital, while others believe it is 
a chosen lifestyle.68  Whatever the reason, the Court has struggled with sexual 
orientation’s classification in relation to the Equal Protection and Due Pro-
cess Clauses, leading to confusion in the lower courts.69 
The Court’s first effort to determine scrutiny based on sexual orientation 
was in 1986 in Bowers v. Hardwick.70  In Bowers, Michael Hardwick was 
charged with violating a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by engaging in 
consensual sodomy with another competent adult male.71  Hardwick brought 
suit in federal district court, asserting that the statute violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.72  The Court 
upheld the statute on the ground that the U.S. Constitution did not extend a 
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy.73  The 
Court stated that Hardwick’s argument that his right to engage in sodomy was 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty” was “facetious.”74  According to the Court, because 
the law was based on morality, it satisfied rational basis scrutiny.75 
The Court’s next decision with respect to sexual orientation occurred ten 
years later in Romer v. Evans.76  In Romer, Richard Evans, other homosexual 
persons, and municipalities challenged the validity of an amendment to the 
Colorado state constitution (“Amendment 2”), which repealed municipal or-
dinances that banned discrimination against individuals due to their sexual 
orientation.77  Amendment 2 also prohibited any state or local legislative, 
 
 65. Id. at 2776-77 (quoting City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445). 
 66. Claus, supra note 60, at 151. 
 67. Id. at 173. 
 68. Id. at 171. 
 69. Id. at 153. 
 70. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 71. Id. at 187-88. 
 72. Id. at 188. 
 73. Id. at 192. 
 74. Id. at 194. 
 75. Id. at 196. 
 76. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 77. Id. at 623-24 (“For example, the cities of Aspen and Boulder and the city and 
county of Denver each had enacted ordinances which banned discrimination in many 
transactions and activities, including housing, employment, education, public accom-
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 16
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol79/iss4/16
2014] STAND WITH SAM 1103 
executive, or judicial action that protected homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexu-
als.78  The Court held that the amendment violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause: “Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to 
further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else . . . 
.  [A] state cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.”79  The 
Court was silent as to whether sexual orientation was a suspect classification 
because Amendment 2’s discrimination against homosexual conduct bore no 
“rational relation to some legitimate end,” therefore Amendment 2 failed 
even rational basis scrutiny.80  Amendment 2, according to the Court, need-
lessly discriminated against a particular group, and served no purpose other 
than to foster animosity toward a particular class of people.81 
The Court’s next major sexual orientation decision was in 2003 in Law-
rence v. Texas,82 which overruled Bowers by striking down a Texas statute 
criminalizing sexual intercourse with a consenting, competent adult of the 
same sex.83  The Court stated that “[homosexuals’] right to liberty under the 
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct with-
out intervention of the government.”84  Lawrence, for the first time, identified 
gay and lesbian individuals as a class of people, not as a group of people who 
engaged in homosexual conduct.85  However, the Court’s ruling relied on the 
Due Process Clause, claiming that invalidating the statute under the Equal 
Protection Clause would have left Bowers intact and perhaps would have 
allowed state statutes banning sodomy to be construed as valid as long as they 
applied to heterosexual couples as well.86  The Court’s use of the Due Process 
 
modations, and health and welfare services.  What gave rise to the statewide contro-
versy was the protection the ordinances afforded to persons discriminated against by 
reason of sexual orientation.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 78. Id. at 624 (“No protected status based on homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual 
orientation.  Neither the state of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, 
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall 
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homo-
sexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall consti-
tute or otherwise be the basis to entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim 
any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.  
This section of the constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); see DENVER, CO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE art. IV, § 28-92 
(1991) (defining “sexual orientation” as “[t]he status of an individual as to his or her 
heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality”). 
 79. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
 80. Id. at 631-32. 
 81. Id. at 635. 
 82. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 83. Id. at 578. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Claus, supra note 60, at 158. 
 86. See id. at 158-59. 
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Clause enabled the Court to avoid addressing whether sexual orientation was 
a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause.87 
C.  The Missouri Constitution’s Prohibition of Same-Sex Marriage 
The court in Glossip held that the Missouri Constitution’s ban on same-
sex marriage had no impact on Glossip’s inability to obtain survivor benefits 
from his partner, but Glossip argued that his inability to marry Engelhard in 
Missouri was the reason they could not obtain a marriage license and thus 
fulfill the requirement under the survivor benefits statute.88  Article I, Section 
33 of the Missouri Constitution states “[t]hat to be valid and recognized in 
this state, a marriage shall exist only between a man and a woman.”89  Sec-
tion 33, enacted on June 3, 2004, was likely a legislative reaction to Law-
rence v. Texas.90  States such as Missouri have stated that same-sex marriages 
are contrary to the state’s public policy.91 
D.  Missouri’s Surviving Spouse Benefits Statute 
Glossip argued that the Missouri surviving spouse benefits statute vio-
lated his equal protection rights under the Missouri Constitution.92  Glossip 
referenced the 2002 version of the survivorship benefits statute.93  At that 
time, the Missouri Revised Statutes Section 104.140.1(1) and (2) provided 
survivorship benefits for a surviving spouse,94 “calculated as if the member 
were of normal retirement age and had retired as of the date of the member’s 
death . . . .”95  For purposes of the statute, “spouse” was defined by a “mar-
riage between a man and a woman.”96  As of 2013, the Missouri legislature 
added that the decedent needed to provide five or more years of creditable 
service prior to death for the surviving spouse benefits to attach.97 
 
 87. See id. at 158. 
 88. Glossip v. Mo. Dep’t of Transp. & Highway Patrol Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 411 
S.W.3d 796, 799 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 89. MO. CONST. art. I, § 33. 
 90. See generally 539 U.S. 558 (2003); supra Part III.B. 
 91. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconsti-
tutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1970-76 (1997). 
 92. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 800-01. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Alternatively, if there is no surviving spouse, the benefits would go to the 
decedent’s children who are under the age of twenty-one.  MO. REV. STAT. § 
104.140.1(2) (Supp. 2001); see also MO. REV. STAT. §104.012 (Supp. 2001). 
 95. § 104.140.1(2) (Supp. 2001). 
 96. § 104.012 (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). 
 97. MO. REV. STAT. § 104.140.1(1) (2012). 
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E.  Missouri’s Marriage Statute 
Glossip argued that the survivor benefits statute violated his equal pro-
tection rights because he was discriminated against on the basis of his sexual 
orientation.98  Missouri Revised Statutes Section 451.022 states that, 
1. It is the public policy of this state to recognize marriage only be-
tween a man and a woman. 2. Any purported marriage not between a 
man and a woman is invalid. 3. No recorder shall issue a marriage li-
cense, except to a man and a woman. 4. A marriage between persons 
of the same sex will not be recognized for any purpose in this state 
even when valid where contracted.99 
He claimed that his inability to get married was due to the Missouri Constitu-
tion100 and Section 451.022.101 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
A.  Majority Opinion 
In Glossip v. Missouri Department of Transportation and Highway Pa-
trol Employees’ Retirement System, the Supreme Court of Missouri began by 
reciting the Equal Protection Clause of the Missouri Constitution.102  The 
court then determined which standard of review to use.103  The court consid-
ered intermediate scrutiny,104 but ultimately rejected it in favor of rational 
basis scrutiny.105  Intermediate scrutiny, according to the court, has been ap-
plied to cases involving gender discrimination, but rational basis scrutiny was 
chosen after the court determined that marriage was the discriminatory fea-
ture.106 
The court determined that Glossip had standing to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the survivor benefits statute – Missouri Revised Statutes Section 
140.140 – but not to challenge the ban on same-sex married couples – Mis-
souri Revised Statutes Section 104.012 – because he was “not a member of 
the class of persons disadvantaged by the statute.”107  According to the court, 
Glossip had standing to challenge the survivor benefits statute because he was 
within the class of persons he alleged were unconstitutionally denied bene-
 
 98. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 801. 
 99. MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (2012). 
 100. See supra Part II. 
 101. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 800. 
 102. Id. at 801. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See supra Part II. 
 105. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 805. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 803. 
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fits.108  He argued that the survivor benefits statute distinguished between 
similarly-situated people by requiring marriage to be a prerequisite, and as 
Engelhard’s significant other, he was the functional equivalent of Engelhard’s 
spouse.109  However, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 104.012 limited the 
survivor benefits beneficiaries to opposite-sex married spouses,110 and thus 
distinguished between opposite-sex and same-sex married couples.  Since 
Glossip and Engelhard were not married, Glossip lacked the requisite stand-
ing to contest the statute’s constitutionality.111 
Responding to Glossip’s argument that the survivor benefits statute vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause because the statute discriminated against 
him on the basis of sexual orientation, the court determined that the discrimi-
natory aspect of the statute related to marital status, not sexual orientation.112  
Marriage, stated the court, was a threshold requirement for a prospective ben-
eficiary; without it, no benefits were available.113  The court opined that the 
outcome may have been different if Glossip and Engelhard had married in 
another state, but since they did not, the court declined to surmise what it 
would have held had that been the case.114  The court also suggested that if 
Glossip had challenged the ban on same-sex marriage, its analysis would 
likely have been different.115 
Rational basis scrutiny, stated the court, was the accurate standard of re-
view because the Missouri Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause was con-
sistent in scope with the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, and the 
U.S. Supreme Court has never held marriage to be a characteristic worthy of 
heightened scrutiny.116  The court then recognized that neither the U.S. Su-
preme Court nor the Supreme Court of Missouri has ever determined what 
standard of review should apply to sexual orientation.117  The court left that 
question for another day because the survivor benefits statute discriminated 
based on marital status, not sexual orientation.118 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  Decedent’s surviving children under twenty-one years of age were also 
included.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 104.012 (2012). 
 111. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 803. 
 112. Id. at 804. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 805. 
 116. The court expressed its disinclination to extend the Missouri Constitution’s 
Equal Protection Clause beyond the breadth of the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protec-
tion Clause.  Id. 
 117. The court touched on the landmark cases United States v. Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675 (2013) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), but said that the U.S. 
Supreme Court left open the question of what level of equal protection scrutiny 
should be given to sexual orientation, holding that the statutes at issue in the two 
cases failed even rational basis scrutiny.  Id. at 805-06. 
 118. Id. at 806. 
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Once the court determined the standard of review, it turned to whether 
the statute provided a reasonable relationship to a rational state interest.119  
The court recognized that limiting survivor benefits to spouses provided 
many advantages to the state.120  First, the limitation enhanced administrative 
efficiency.121  It was “reasonably conceiv[able]” that married couples were 
more economically dependent on their spouses than were non-married part-
ners.122  Furthermore, spouses owed a duty of support under Missouri law, a 
legal obligation absent in non-marital relationships.123  According to the 
court, this notion of marriage coupled with financial interdependence estab-
lished a rational basis.124 
Secondly, limiting survivor benefits to surviving spouses and children 
helped preserve limited economic funds.125  The Missouri General Assembly 
could have expanded the reach of the survivor benefits statute to all persons 
economically dependent on the deceased employee, but it chose not to, and 
the court found that the choice was rational.126  Lastly, the spousal require-
ment enhanced administrative efficiency.127  Had the General Assembly ex-
tended the reach of the benefits statute to others, resolving claims would be a 
much more expensive and cumbersome task.128  It was rational to limit the 
beneficiaries for this purpose.129 
Because Missouri’s survivor benefits statute discriminated in favor of 
married couples to the disadvantage of non-married couples and did not dis-
criminate based on sexual orientation, the court upheld the statute under the 
Equal Protection Clause.130 
B.  Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Teitelman wrote the dissenting opinion.131  He argued that for 
centuries, gays and lesbians have battled inequality, persecution, and subjuga-
tion both socially and legally.132  Judge Teitelman opined that Missouri Re-
vised Statutes Sections 104.140 and 104.012 perpetuate these negative ef-
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 807. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 809 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 132. Id. 
13
Hall: Stand with Sam
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
1108 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
fects.133  The majority’s holding, according to the dissent, used a definition of 
“spouse” that disadvantaged gays and lesbians.134 
The dissent was unpersuaded by the majority’s justification that the sur-
vivor benefits statute discriminated against Glossip because of his marital 
status and not his sexual orientation.135  Specifically, when the survivor bene-
fits statute was read in conjunction with the statute’s definition of “spouse,” 
survivor benefits were a legal impossibility for all same-sex couples, regard-
less of their marital status.136  Since same-sex couples were barred from mar-
riage by both the state constitution137 and state statute,138 the dissent believed 
that discriminating against couples based on their marital status simultaneous-
ly created discrimination based upon sexual orientation.139 
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s assertion that Glossip’s 
argument failed because he did not challenge Missouri’s proscription of gay 
marriage.140  According to the dissent, the state could provide benefits to gay 
and lesbian survivors without a marital condition.141  The dissent claimed that 
just because same-sex marriage was banned in Missouri did not mean that 
depriving gays and lesbians of their rights was justified.142  By electing to 
grant benefits only to persons legally married, the state intentionally blocked 
an entire class of people from access to these benefits.143 
Furthermore, the dissent posited, because the majority opinion incorrect-
ly held that the class discriminated against involved unmarried couples rather 
than gays and lesbians, the majority applied the wrong level of scrutiny.144  
Classifications that disadvantage groups “that have been subjected to historic 
patterns of disadvantage” are often accorded intermediate scrutiny, and the 
majority erred in applying rational basis scrutiny.145  The dissent, when it 
applied intermediate scrutiny, determined that the survivor benefits statute 
and its accompanying statutory definitions did not withstand this heightened 
scrutiny.146 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 809-10. 
 136. Id. at 810. 
 137. See supra Part III.C. 
 138. See supra Part III.E. 
 139. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 810-11 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 811-12. 
 141. Id. at 812. 
 142. Id. at 811. 
 143. Id. at 812. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 812-13 (“Under intermediate or heightened scrutiny, the classification 
is permissible only if it is substantially related to the achievement of important gov-
ernmental objectives.”). 
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First, it was implausible to believe that Glossip and Engelhard were not 
as financially interdependent as a traditional opposite-sex married couple.147  
Moreover, the nexus between marriage and financial interdependence did not 
withstand rational basis scrutiny – much less intermediate scrutiny.148  Sec-
ond, while the state was free to apply “objective”149 criteria to the statute, the 
state was not able to apply whatever “objective” criteria it desired and assume 
that the criteria were constitutionally sound.150  To underscore the importance 
of financial interdependence in granting survivor benefits disbursements, the 
state could have requested evidence of “long-term commitment and financial 
interdependence.”151  Finally, the dissent balked at the majority’s holding that 
excluding same-sex couples from benefits provided a cost-control function.152  
If cost control were enough to justify discrimination subject to heightened 
scrutiny, cost control would be a commonly-employed justification by the 
state.153  After all, stated the dissent, “discrimination is cheaper than equal 
protection.”154 
Judge Teitelman expressed concern with this holding not only because 
he believed the majority chose the wrong classification and applied the wrong 
level of scrutiny, but also because he believed this opinion would remain a 
blemish on Missouri’s constitutional jurisprudence once the Supreme Court 
of Missouri gets it right.155  Just as Brown v. Board of Education156 cleansed 
the U.S. Supreme Court of the blemish left by Plessy v. Ferguson157 in 1896, 
Teitelman believed that future case law would correct the Glossip error.158  
However, warned Judge Teitelman, even if the court ultimately corrects itself, 
the time lost and harm done will have been irreparable to those discriminated 
against.159 
 
 147. Id. at 813. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Verdict at 15, Glossip v. Mo. Dep’t of Transp. & Highway Patrol Emps.’ 
Ret. Sys., 411 S.W.3d 796 (Mo. 2013) (No. SC92583), 2013 WL 364570, *14.  The 
court stated that the “objective” criteria used by the statute were administrative effi-
ciency, controlling costs, and preserving limited retirement resources.  Glossip, 411 
S.W.3d at 813 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 150. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 813 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 151. Id. at 814. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 810. 
 156. Id. at 809 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that state-sponsored “separate but equal” public schools 
violated the Equal Protection Clause)). 
 157. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 158. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 810 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 159. See id. at 809-14. 
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V.  COMMENT 
A.  Sexual Orientation Should Be Accorded Heightened Scrutiny 
The Supreme Court of Missouri erred when it held that Kelly Glossip 
was not eligible for survivor benefits because he and Dennis Engelhard were 
not married at the time of Engelhard’s death.160  The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri also erred when it held that Glossip was discriminated against because 
he and Engelhard were not married.161  The court erred because it used the 
wrong classification to determine which level of scrutiny to apply.162  Be-
cause the survivor benefits statute indirectly discriminated against Glossip 
based on his sexual orientation, the discriminating characteristic was that he 
and Engelhard were gay.163  And because sexual orientation – not marriage – 
was the discriminating characteristic, the claim should have received height-
ened scrutiny.164 
1.  The Survivor Benefits Statute Discriminates on the Basis of Sexual 
Orientation 
Glossip and Engelhard were not married when Engelhard died, but they 
were in a “committed marital relationship” and “would have entered into a 
civil marriage if it were legal to do so in Missouri.”165  The majority deter-
mined that, because Glossip and Engelhard were not married, Glossip was not 
entitled to the survivor benefits.166  However, Glossip and Engelhard could 
not get married in Missouri.167  Missouri statutory law explicitly forbade it,168 
the survivor benefits statute explicitly refused to acknowledge same-sex mar-
riages,169 and – lest anyone fail to take the hint – the Missouri Constitution 
 
 160. See id. at 805 (majority opinion). 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. at 813 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 163. See id. at 810-11. 
 164. See id. at 813. 
 165. Id. at 800 (majority opinion) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. at 810 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 168. MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (Supp. 2001) (“1. It is the public policy of this 
state to recognize marriage only between a man and a woman.  2. Any purported 
marriage not between a man and a woman is invalid.  3. No recorder shall issue a 
marriage license, except to a man and a woman.  4. A marriage between persons of 
the same sex will not be recognized for any purpose in this state even when valid 
where contracted.”). 
 169. MO. REV. STAT. § 104.012 (Supp. 2001) (“For the purposes of public retire-
ment systems administered pursuant to this chapter, any reference to the term 
‘spouse’ only recognizes marriage between a man and a woman.”). 
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explicitly prohibited same-sex marriages.170  Until recently, Missouri refused 
to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states, maintaining that 
same-sex marriage is contrary to Missouri’s public policy.171  Thus, the 
court’s assertion that Missouri’s survivor benefits statute discriminated 
against Glossip because he and Engelhard failed to marry was erroneous, 
albeit convenient because it permitted the court to avoid determining what 
level of scrutiny to apply to sexual orientation.172  Glossip and Engelhard 
could not get married in Missouri, and Glossip and Engelhard’s out-of-state 
marriage license (had they obtained one) would not have been accepted in 
Missouri at the time of the case.173  Thus, the discussion of whether Glossip 
and Engelhard could have or should have been married was irrelevant be-
cause Missouri courts were proscribed from recognizing it.  Because Missouri 
statutory and constitutional law made it impossible for Glossip and Engelhard 
to be married in Missouri, and because their marriage was forbidden by virtue 
of them being gay, Missouri’s survivor benefits statute made it impossible for 
Glossip to obtain survivor benefits.174  The distinction at issue was sexual 
orientation.175 
2.  Gays and Lesbians Have Endured Discrimination for Decades 
Sexual orientation should receive heightened or “intermediate” equal 
protection scrutiny.176  Gays and lesbians have been discriminated against, 
subjugated, and stigmatized throughout history.177  They have been the target 
 
 170. MO. CONST. art. I, §33 (“That to be valid and recognized in this state, a mar-
riage shall exist only between a man and a woman.”). 
 171. § 451.022.1; see also Kevin Tuininga, Toward Predictable Choice of Law in 
Missouri, 65 J. MO. B. 14, 20 (2009) (explaining that, even when choice of law provi-
sions favor application of non-Missouri state law, marriages between same-sex cou-
ples performed in other states are invalid in Missouri).  However, as of the writing of 
this Note, the state of the law in Missouri is in flux: a recent ruling in Missouri re-
quires the state to now recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states, and 
other recent court decisions have allowed same-sex individuals to marry in certain 
parts of the state.  See Missouri, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry
.org/states/entry/c/missouri (last visited Jan. 4, 2015). 
 172. See Glossip, 411 S.W.3d. at 805 (“This case would be a different analysis if, 
as in the recent case of United States v. Windsor, Glossip and Engelhard had been 
married under the law of another state or jurisdiction.  But that is not this case, and 
this Court must apply the law to the facts before it.  In this case, Glossip is not eligible 
for survivor benefits because he was not married.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 173. See sources cited supra note 171. 
 174. See Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 810-11 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. at 812. 
 177. Brief of Missouri Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, 
Glossip v. Mo. Dep’t of Transp. & Highway Patrol Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 411 S.W.3d 796 
(Mo. 2013) (No. SC92583), 2012 WL 6825482, at *4. 
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of anti-gay legislation,178 verbal chastisement by public officials,179 and even 
violent physical attacks.180  The long history of discrimination against gays 
and lesbians cannot be overlooked; they have been “denied employment, 
targeted for violence, publicly humiliated, and treated as perverts, sinners, 
and criminals.”181  Nearly thirty years ago, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
agreed that historically, homosexuals have been subjected to “antipathy and 
prejudice.”182  Even today, gay and lesbian individuals face potential back-
lash for their sexual orientation.183  As of this writing, the Missouri Senate 
has filed a bill that could protect businesses that refuse service to gays and 
lesbians due to religious reasons.184  This regressive legislation exemplifies 
that gay and lesbian Missourians are still treated as a subclass of humans.  
When compared to other social groups, homosexuals are still among the most 
stigmatized nationally: many gay teens are bullied and humiliated in 
 
 178. Jonathan Shorman, Mo. Joins States Mulling Anti-Gay Religious Bills, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 26, 2014, 12:09 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/
02/26/missouri-anti-gay-religion-bill/5834319/ (“Sen. Wayne Wallingford, R-Cape 
Girardeau, on Monday filed Senate Bill 916, which would allow businesses to cite 
religious belief as a legal justification for refusing service.”). 
 179. Brief of Mayor Francis Slay, Congresswoman Lacy Clay, and Certain Cur-
rent and Former Members of the Missouri General Assembly as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Appellant Kelly D. Glossip, Glossip v. Mo. Dep’t of Transp. and Highway 
Patrol Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 411 S.W.3d 796 (Mo. 2013) (No. SC92583), 2012 WL 
10159357, at *14 (“Missouri State University’s addition of sexual orientation to the 
list of protected classes in its anti-discrimination policy was bookended by bias-laced 
rhetoric.  In a letter to alumni before the change, the university’s president wrote that 
homosexuality was a ‘biological perversion’ and ‘intrinsically disordered.’”).  Fur-
thermore, in the mid 1970s, the University of Missouri refused to recognize the stu-
dent group “Gay Lib” because it represented and “perpetuated an abnormal way of 
life” and would allow “the sick and abnormal to counsel others who are similarly ill 
and abnormal . . . .”  Id. at *16.  The state’s two largest universities have historically 
rejected the prospect of gays and lesbians interacting on their own campuses. 
 180. Lila Shapiro, Highest Number of Anti-Gay Murders Ever Reported in 2011: 
The National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, HUFFINGTON POST (June 2, 2012, 
1:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/02/anti-gay-hate-crimes-murders-
national-coalition-of-anti-violence-programs_n_1564885.html. 
 181. Brief Of Constitutional Law Scholars Bruce Ackerman, et al. as Amici Curi-
ae Addressing the Merits and Supporting Affirmance, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. 
Ct. 2652 (2013) (Nos. 12-144, 12-307), 2013 WL 795542, at *8. 
 182. Brief of Missouri Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, 
supra note 177, at *13. 
 183. See Anti Gay Attacks, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
tag/anti-gay-attacks (last visited April 4, 2014) (listing articles regarding recent anti-
gay attacks across the United States). 
 184. Jonathan Shorman, State Senator Files Bill to Protect Businesses That Dis-
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school,185 and professionals fear negative co-worker reactions by identifying 
as gay at their workplace.186  People are being targeted and attacked, solely 
due to their sexual orientations.187 
3.  Gay and Lesbian Citizens Have a Small Political Voice 
A recent study found that only about 1.7% of the U.S. population and 
.75% of Missourians identify as gay or lesbian.188  Fear of retaliation prevents 
many gay individuals from engaging in political discourse aimed at demand-
ing a positive change.189  Anti-gay hate crimes represent an increasingly large 
percentage of total hate crimes in the United States.190  Furthermore, the 
threat of private ostracism and discrimination prevents gay and lesbian citi-
zens from participating politically, opting instead to “stay in the closet.”191  
And while the 113th United States Congress boasts seven openly gay or bi-
sexual Congress members,192 Missouri’s General Assembly has had only five 
openly gay members: Representative Tim Van Zandt,193 Representative 
Zachary Wyatt,194 Representative Mike Colona,195 Representative Jeanette 
 
 185. See Jane Riese, Youth Who Are Bullied Based on Perceptions About Their 
Sexual Orientation, VIOLENCE PREVENTION WORKS!, http://www.violencepreven-
tionworks.org/public/bullying_sexual_orientation.page (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
 186. See Brief of Mayor Francis Slay, Congresswoman Lacy Clay, and Certain 
Current and Former Members of the Missouri General Assembly as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Appellant Kelly D. Glossip, supra note 179, at *15. 
 187. See id. at *16 (quoting Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 
434 (Conn. 2008)). 
 188. Id. at *11. 
 189. See generally sources cited infra notes 192-206. 
 190. See Brief for Respondents at 31, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 649742, at *31. 
 191. See generally id. 
 192. Carlos Santoscoy, Seven Openly LGBT Members in 113th Congress, ON TOP 
MAGAZINE (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.ontopmag.com/article.aspx?id=14009. 
 193. See Kim Bell, Gay Legislator Introduces Bill to Repeal Ban on Homosexual 
Sex, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 26, 1998), http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/
usa/missouri/monews02.htm; see also Finding Aid 552.14, MO. STATE ARCHIVES, 
http://www.sos.mo.gov/archives/resources/findingaids/lp/552-14.pdf (last visited Oct. 
5, 2014); Tim Van Zandt, MO. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://house.missouri
.gov/content.aspx?info=/bills01/member01/bio038.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2014). 
 194. See Wes Duplanter, Zachary Wyatt, Missouri Lawmaker, Says He Is Gay, 
Denounces ‘Don’t Say Gay’ Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (July 2, 2012, 5:12 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/02/zachary-wyatt-gay-gop-missouri-lawmaker-
dont-say-gay_n_1471191.html; see also Zachary Wyatt, MO. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.mo.gov/member.aspx?district=002&year=2011 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2014). 
 195. See Danny Wicentowski, State Rep. Mike Colona Seeks Repeal of Missouri’s 
Gay Marriage Ban, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://blogs.riverf-
ronttimes.com/dailyrft/2014/03/state_rep_mike_colona_seeks_re.php; see also Mike 
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Mott Oxford,196 and Senator Jolie Justus,197 with Senator Justus and Repre-
sentative Colona being the only current gay politicians still serving the 
state.198  In 2013, Missouri legislators attempted to pass a “Don’t Say Gay” 
bill, which would have forbidden the mention of sexual orientation in public 
schools.199  Furthermore, the MPERS was established in 1955,200 but Mis-
souri Revised Statutes Section 104.012 – the provision that recognized a 
“surviving spouse” only as an opposite-sex spouse – was added in 2001,201 
prior to any other U.S. state law permitting same-sex marriage anywhere in 
the United States.202 
As an analogy, compare the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of the politi-
cal power of women.203  The Court measured women’s political power in 
terms of the impact that discrimination had on the number of women elected 
into the House of Representatives or nominated to the Supreme Court, and 
even noted that there has never been a female president.204  Gender discrimi-
nation claims are afforded heightened scrutiny,205 although women’s ability 
to mobilize and fight legislation contrary to their promotion is much stronger 
than that of gay and lesbian citizens.206  There is an implication that sexual 
 
Colona, MO. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://house.mo.gov/member.aspx?year
=2011&district=067 (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
 196. See Shalia Dewan, United Church of Christ Backs Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 5, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/05/national/05church.html?
incamp=article_popular_5&_r=1&; see also Jeanette Mott Oxford, MO. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.mo.gov/member.aspx?district=059&year=2012 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
 197. See HRC Staff, Senator Jolie Justus Leads the Effort to Pass Nondiscrimina-
tion Act in Missouri, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.hrc.org/
blog/entry/senator-jolie-justus-leads-the-effort-to-pass-nondiscrimination-act-in-miss; 
see also Jolie Justus, MO. SENATE, http://www.senate.mo.gov/09info/members/
mem10.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
 198. See sources cited supra notes 195, 197. 
 199. See John Celock, Missouri ‘Don’t Say Gay’ Bill: GOP Sponsors Wary of 
‘Homosexual Agenda’, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 24, 2012, 11:46 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/23/missouri-dont-say-gay-bill_n_1447121.html. 
 200. See History of MPERS, MODOT & PATROL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYS., 
http://www.mpers.org/screenprintinfopage.aspx?menuitemid=198&menusubid=0 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
 201. MO. REV. STAT. § 104.012 (Supp. 2001). 
 202. Massachusetts became the first state to allow same-sex marriage via court 
order.  See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 203. See generally Emily K. Baxter, Note, Rationalizing Away Political Power-
lessness: Equal Protection Analysis of Laws Classifying Gays and Lesbians, 72 MO. 
L. REV. 891 (2007). 
 204. Id. at 904-05 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1972)). 
 205. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 518 (1996) (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama 
ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994) (“[A]ll gender-based classifications today 
[warrant] heightened scrutiny.”)). 
 206. Baxter, supra note 203, at 905. 
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orientation should be a suspect classification because its political mobiliza-
tion powers are intrinsically weaker than those of other suspect classifica-
tions, such as gender and race.207 
4.  Gay and Lesbian Individuals’ Contributions to Society 
Homosexuality has no bearing on a person’s ability to contribute to so-
ciety.208  In 1975, the American Psychological Association removed homo-
sexuality from its official list of mental disorders and adopted the following 
resolution: 
Homosexuality per se implies no impairment in judgment, stability, 
reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities; Further, the 
American Psychological Association urges all mental health profes-
sionals to take the lead in removing the stigma of mental illness that 
has been long associated with homosexual orientations.209 
Sexual orientation does not, and cannot, disable a person or render that 
individual less capable of being a lawyer, doctor, parent, teacher, judge, po-
lice officer, nurse, or plumber.210  One needs only to look at the media, where 
famous and successful celebrities and business moguls have managed to gain 
immense success despite – or perhaps because of – their homosexuality.211 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. Brief of Missouri Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, 
supra note 177, at *15 (citing Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 435 
(Conn. 2008) (“[A]n individual’s homosexual orientation ‘implies no impairment in 
judgment, stability, reliability or general social or vocational capabilities.’”)). 
 209. Discrimination Against Homosexuals, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Jan. 26, 1975), 
http://www.apa.org/about/policy/discrimination.aspx; see also Brief of Missouri Law 
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, supra note 177, at *15. 
 210. Brief Of Constitutional Law Scholars Bruce Ackerman, et al. as Amici Curi-
ae Addressing the Merits and Supporting Affirmance, supra note 181, at *3. 
 211. World Pride Power List 2013: 100 Most Influential LGBT People of the 
Year, GUARDIAN (June 28, 2013), http://careers.theguardian.com/world-pride-power-
list-2013-11-100.  The list names Ellen DeGeneres, multi-Emmy-award-winning 
actress, writer, stand-up comedian, and host of one of America’s most successful talk 
shows; Tim Cook, CEO of Apple; Sir Elton John, award-winning songwriter; Ander-
son Cooper, anchor of the CNN news show Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees; Jodie 
Foster, Oscar-winning actress; Anthony Watson, MD and CIO of Barclays and chair 
of the European Diversity Awards; and Daniel Winterfeldt, a United States securities 
lawyer and head of CMS’s International Capital Markets Group, to name a few.  Id. 
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5.  Sexual Orientation Is an Immutable Characteristic 
Whether a person is “born” gay or “chooses” to be gay is still contest-
ed,212 but courts and society do not contest that a person’s sexual orientation 
is extremely personal and central to that person’s identity as a human be-
ing.213  Arguably, being homosexual denotes a stronger tie to one’s sexuality 
than being heterosexual, because homosexuals are often targets of harass-
ment, violence, and bullying, exemplifying that a person would opt for the 
heterosexual lifestyle if the issue were not so integral to his or her person-
hood.214  Suspect classifications are often determined by asking whether it 
would be “abhorrent . . . to penalize a person for refusing to change [the trait 
in question].”215  Americans value their sexual happiness; it is a major aspect 
of relationships with a significant other (whether of the same sex or not) and 
it intimately connects them to their personality, sense of identity, and self-
expression.216  No governmental branch – whether the legislature enacting a 
statute, the executive branch issuing an administrative regulation, or the judi-
ciary creating new common law – has the authority or power to dictate a per-
son’s sexual orientation.  And just because a person is gay does not mean he 
or she is not entitled to fundamental individual constitutional rights.217 
The court in Glossip erroneously held that marriage – and not sexual 
orientation – was the discriminatory characteristic.218  In doing so, the court 
skirted past the issue of whether to accord sexual orientation heightened scru-
tiny.219  The court’s holding impedes gays’ and lesbians’ rights because it 
remained silent on the issue of sexual orientation’s protection under the Mis-
souri Equal Protection Clause.  Missouri’s gay and lesbian residents deserve 
better treatment. 
 
 212. See generally Marcia Malory, Homosexuality & Choice: Are Gay People 
‘Born This Way?’, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2012, 8:34 AM), http://www.huff-
ingtonpost.com/2012/10/23/homosexuality--choice-born-science_n_2003361.html.  A 
study published in a 1993 edition of the journal Science showed that families with two 
homosexual brothers were very likely to have certain genetic markers on a region of 
the X chromosome, which researchers believed illustrated that sexual preference has a 
genetic component.  Id. 
 213. Brief of Missouri Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, 
supra note 177, at 16. 
 214. Overcoming Anti-Gay Harassment, U. ROCHESTER MED. CENTER, http://
www.urmc.rochester.edu/encyclopedia/content.aspx?ContentTypeID=1&ContentID=
4564 (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (“For far too many people, being gay or lesbian 
means having to deal with prejudice and harassment from childhood onward.”). 
 215. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438 (Conn. 
2008). 
 216. Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 21, 36 (2010). 
 217. See Glossip v. Mo. Dep’t of Transp. & Highway Patrol Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 411 
S.W.3d 796, 812 (Mo. 2013) (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 813. 
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B.  Missouri Is Failing Its Gay and Lesbian Residents 
To survive equal protection analysis when subjected to heightened or 
“intermediate” scrutiny, a statutory classification must serve an “important 
government interest,” and the classification must be substantially related to 
achieving that objective.220  The court proffered three reasons why the survi-
vor benefits statute survived rational basis scrutiny.221  However, had the 
court applied the appropriate standard, the factors listed would not rise to the 
level of an “important government interest” needed to sustain the statute 
against a heightened level of equal protection scrutiny.222 
First, the court argued that providing survivor benefits to married spous-
es who were financially dependent on the decedent was a legitimate state 
interest because that spouse would have been more dependent on his or her 
spouse’s income than on that of a non-married partner.223  This fails rational 
basis scrutiny, as well as heightened scrutiny, because a marriage certificate 
is not a prerequisite to financial interdependence.224  There are approximately 
650,000 same-sex households in the U.S., including almost 11,000 same-sex 
households in Missouri.225  St. Louis ranks eleventh highest in concentration 
of households headed by same-sex partners in the country.226  Furthermore, it 
is estimated that Missouri same-sex couples parented over 5,400 children in 
2005.227  Most of these families depend on dual incomes – just as heterosexu-
al couples do – to maintain their standard of living.228  Glossip and Engelhard 
had been in a committed relationship for eighteen years and the state even 
conceded that they were financially interdependent.229  Glossip, as a member 
of Engelhard’s household and a man mourning the loss of his loved one, de-
served to receive survivor benefits. 
Second, the court stated that the spousal requirement served the interest 
of controlling costs because the General Assembly could have provided sur-
vivor benefits to more people, but chose instead to provide it to spouses and 
children.230  This is rational, stated the court, because providing disburse-
ments to a smaller group of people meant that each individual got a larger 
 
 220. See supra notes 176-187 and accompanying text. 
 221. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 806-08. 
 222. Id. at 813-14 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 223. Id. at 806 (majority opinion). 
 224. Id. at 814 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 225. Amicus Curiae Brief of Law Enforcement Gays and Lesbians (Legal) Inter-
national and Its Affiliated Chapters, Glossip v. Mo. Dept. of Transp. & Highway 
Patrol Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 411 S.W.3d 796 (Mo. 2013) (No. SC92583), 2012 WL 
6825481, at *9. 
 226. Id. at *11. 
 227. Id. at *12. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 813 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 230. Id. at 807 (majority opinion). 
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slice of the survivor benefits pie.231  This “objective” criterion easily fails 
heightened or “intermediate” scrutiny because it is both arbitrary and contrary 
to legislative intent.232  As stated, Glossip and Engelhard possessed all of the 
requisite characteristics of a married couple, absent the official piece of paper 
from the state.233  Glossip and Engelhard were dependent on each other; 
Glossip gave up his job as a customer service representative at Great South-
ern Bank when Engelhard became a police officer.234  Glossip moved with 
Engelhard from Springfield, Missouri, to Washington, Missouri, and then to 
Robertsville, Missouri.235  The couple owned a home together, and they 
joined a church and attended services with Glossip’s son.236  Engelhard co-
parented with Glossip in raising Glossip’s son and shared child support obli-
gations.237  When Engelhard was rushed to the hospital on Christmas Day, 
Glossip was the only family member who went to see him, holding his hand 
for hours although he had already passed away.238  The court held that none 
of these actions mattered because Glossip and Engelhard could not receive a 
marriage certificate proclaiming their marriage to the state.239  This notion 
confounds all rationality and distorts the legislation’s interest in providing 
dependent loved ones financial remuneration for their loss. 
Lastly, the court stated that limiting the survivor benefits to surviving 
spouses served the interest of “administrative efficiency” because, otherwise, 
claims against the decedent’s benefits would increase, creating enhanced 
expenses associated with resolving those claims.240  Beyond irrational, this 
“objective criterion” is cruel.241  Loved ones who have suffered immense loss 
and unspeakable tragedy are left to fend for themselves and pick up the pieces 
of their shattered lives without state benefits to which they are entitled, all 
because it is easier to process claims with a marriage certificate.242  Since 
Engelhard’s death, Glossip has had to pay his mortgage, car loans, and other 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 813-14 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 233. See id. at 813. 
 234. Amicus Curiae Brief of Law Enforcement Gays and Lesbians (Legal) Inter-
national and Its Affiliated Chapters, supra note 225, at *16. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at *17. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Glossip v. Mo. Dep’t of Transp. & Highway Patrol Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 411 
S.W.3d 796, 807 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 813-14 (Teitelman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he state is not free to choose 
whatever ‘objective’ criteria it wants.  Objectivity is not synonymous with constitu-
tional validity.  National origin and sex are objective criteria, yet no one would con-
tend seriously that the objectivity of either classification conclusively would establish 
the constitutional validity of statutes based on those classifications.”). 
 242. Amicus Curiae Brief of Law Enforcement Gays and Lesbians (Legal) Inter-
national and Its Affiliated Chapters, supra note 225, at *24-25. 
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expenses on his own.243  He lost his significant other, his friend, and a co-
parent to his son, as well as a source of income.244  And the state of Missouri 
turned a blind eye because “discrimination is cheaper than equal protec-
tion.”245 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Glossip evaded the monumental issue of whether sexual orientation 
should be accorded heightened scrutiny and instead erroneously subjugated 
gay and lesbian citizens’ rights.  Missouri’s judicial system must concede that 
gay and lesbian individuals have a right to be in Missouri, to prosper here, 
and to receive fundamental federal and state constitutional rights.  As Judge 
Teitelman alluded to in his dissent, perhaps one day society will look back 
with a collective sigh, happy to see Glossip overruled and sexual orientation 
afforded meaningful protection inherent under the equal protection clauses.246  
Unfortunately, they will have to ask, “Why did it take so long?”247 
 
 243. Id. at *17. 
 244. Id. at *16-17. 
 245. Glossip, 411 S.W.3d at 814 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 246. See id. 
 247. Id. at 810. 
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